

Full Length Research Paper

The Contribution of National and International Institutions to the Security of the Republic of Sudan

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ABSTRACT: The study sought to investigate the role of national and international institutions in Sudan's security. The study was also founded on phenomenological ontology, which entailed describing the experiences as they occurred. The study used qualitatively selected categories of respondents, such as officials in the Executive, Judiciary, and Legislative arms of government, as well as respondents from social institutions and opinion leaders, in conjunction with Sudanese archival data. The study discovered that national institutions in Sudan had failed to deal with local disputes that had widened again, and international institutions had either perpetrated the interests of aliens as faced during State formation, or had exacerbated societal, environmental, and political threats through policies based on the assistance provided. The study advocated for the strengthening of State institutions and the harnessing of democracy in order to accommodate international institutions within State structures as a means of instilling a strong sense of security in the Republic of Sudan.

Keywords: National, international, institutions, security and Sudan

INTRODUCTION

According to philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, national security has become one of the most important aspects of State survival. Several authors, including McSweeney (1999), Makinda (1998), Williams (20078), and others, have debated various aspects of national security, but have only sparingly related it to State formation. Interestingly, it has not only been a concern of the State, but of the entire State system or the international system, because what happens in one State can cause a domino effect and cause an insecurity dilemma. This has been a concern not only of the State, but of the entire State system of the international system. National security is a component of international security, and in most cases, it leads to an insecurity quandary in a given State, becoming a source of multiple threats for a region or the entire international system (Annan, 2005).

Political insecurity and instability are widespread across the African continent, impeding progress at the national

and regional levels. From urban crime to terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, and Al-Qaida, to civil wars, political instability, severe insecurity, and coups in Sudan, Somalia, Libya, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya, the African continent has shown remarkable signs. Political insecurity and instability have an impact on all factors of production, causing massive displacement of people, the loss of national investments and lives, and scaring away direct foreign investment. Sudan, as an African State, is an important example of how the process of State formation affects national security.

Sudan has experienced remarkable political instability since its independence in 1956, as evidenced by seven alternating democratic, transitional, and military regimes. Armed conflicts in Sudan have had extremely high social, economic, and political costs. These include the loss of human lives, massive human insecurity, deterioration of

governance and massive loss of economic resources, derailment of development interventions, a widespread sense of social despair, and apparent political instability. The current Darfur crisis has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis manifested by massive population movement, primarily among indigenous peoples and traditional farmers. The genocide perpetrated against the Massalit, Fur, and Zaghawa tribes, as well as other ethnic groups, has prompted the International Criminal Court to indict several people for crimes against humanity, rape, forced transfer, and torture (William, 2012). According to Eric Reeves, over one million children have been "killed, raped, wounded displaced, traumatized, or lost parents and families" (Totten, 2006). As a result, the purpose of this research is to evaluate the factors influencing Sudanese State formation, to investigate the impact of State formation on Sudanese national security, and to determine the contribution of national and international institutions to Sudanese security.

Fredrich (1969) explained in his work that States, like humans, have needs. These needs can be those resources or spaces that are required for sustenance. It is important to note that States may not have desires like humans (Cloke and Johnston, 2005). The distinction is that needs are associated with rights, whereas desires are associated with requests that are uncommon among States. What is important here is that States have needs without which they collapse and new ones emerge, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russia's emergence after 1989. In many cases, safety, which is linked to security, connotes physical safety; however, the need to feel safe or secure is, at best, a psychological issue (George, 2005). This is the same need that arises when political entities contain human beings.

When States achieve the necessary security, they begin to seek belonging, in this case to the international system into which the colonial masters integrated the African States that had not yet achieved the necessary security (Maslow, 1943). These needs ensure the capacities of States in the form of institutions that serve as the protection seeking apparatus (Maslow, 1943). This does not appear to be the case when States in Africa and other continents, primarily in Europe, with different needs in terms of institutions are discussed in the literature, as argued by (Carroll et al., 2009), a wide range of threats from across borders influence the security of citizens in any given State. African States were integrated into the international system or the State system, in which each State faces shared or asymmetrical weaknesses. By introducing African States to social, economic, and communication revolution standards, African States that thought they had benefited became vulnerable to various security threats, and their territories became more fluid since their artificial creation.

To make matters worse, these States had not laid a solid institutional foundation to detect, deter, and defend themselves against such threats, putting their national

security at risk. The economic institutions were weak, their environment was exploited for resources by other powerful States, and the people of the African State became vulnerable to poverty, which is one of the most dangerous threats to the State. The State formation process in these African States was unable to withstand the plethora of social, economic, political, health, and environmental threats that have continued to wreak havoc on these States' national security needs. If national security is defined as the protection and defense of citizens within a given territorial space, it is reasonable to conclude that it is related to global security (Samuel, 1996). As a result, there was a need for a study to provide insight into the relationship between poverty in Africa and the differences in what explains the social, economic, and political differences between African States and the rest of the international system, which this study attempts to investigate.

As there is a fine line between domestic and international security, understanding national security is enhanced by considering it in relation to global security. The presence of the State system (Ayoob, 1995) in the international system causes individual States to understand the State's national security needs and how it survives in a system where States fear other States (Traditional security), as stipulated in the "Hobbesian State" when every man fears another man, and thus a situation that elicits the formation of the State. Mr. Fredrich (1969) According to Ratzel, States in the international system are like living organisms that are born, grow, and eventually die (Fredrich, 1969). They require space to survive and, as a result, there are times when they require space to expand and obtain resources for survival. Because a State is an abstract political phenomenon, the survival of the State, which must have a population as a feature, necessitates that the people be the end of whatever the State requires. As a result, it is critical to recognize that the individual or citizen becomes the principle of State protection.

According to the Copenhagen school, the need to protect the individual in a given territory necessitates the establishment of institutions to protect every other aspect that may pose a threat to the individual in an African State (Barry, 1997). One might be tempted to argue that African countries face unique threats that do not necessarily pose threats to European countries. According to some authors, such as (Ayoob et al., 1995), the African States' current security situation may be a result of their "lateness" in the State formation process. When one examines this 'lateness' critically, one may conclude that State formation is a linear process when, in fact, the term that should be used is 'interruption by invasion' by the already established States of Europe; this is one of the threats against which African States require national security institutions. The concept of protecting individuals in a given territory represents what (Baldwin, 1997) refers to as 'traditional security,' which

examines the military as an institution's requirement to deal with threats posed by external military threats. This is also consistent with (Nesadurai, 2005) perspective. The national security perspective is widely acknowledged to be central to all other security requirements. Nesadurai, for example, has attempted to use the national security perspective, which emphasizes the military threat from external forces, as the defining stance for other security aspects such as economic security.

When it comes to national security, social institutions are among the most important. Political communities begin as social communities and evolve into States. Alonso José Antonio has argued that it is beached in communities, but these communities are guided by their culture and do whatever they do in accordance with their cultures' norms and values (Antonio, 2012). It is important to note that the laws that evolve in any given society are influenced by the culture of a given people, and these laws are designed to strengthen people's unity. It is through such processes that national integration is formed, which ultimately ensures national security when people see themselves as having similar values. In (Rajapaksa, 2011) definition of security, there is the preservation of norms, values, and institutions of society, and he goes on to show that all of these must be protected from military and non-military threats. Religious institutions, cultural institutions, schools, and universities, for example, conduct studies that help to concretize the State's national security.

An ethnic crisis, according to Gunaratna, (1998), can pose a threat to national security. He sees the crisis's historical dimension as an important aspect of the relationship between ethnicity and national security. This implies that the African State's national security has been jeopardized by more than just external military threats. In some cases, one could argue that the process of State formation in the African context was and continues to be responsible for ethnic clashes that are visible in African States. The scramble and partition of African territories resulted in the forced integration of people into areas where they believed they were not a part of the process.

As a result, it is critical for States to have institutions that deal with national integration; otherwise, national security may be jeopardized. Ethnic tensions in many African countries have jeopardized not only the security of the States, but also the security of their citizens. The cessations in Sudan, such as South Sudan's breakaway when the South Sudanese were marginalized by the Northern ruling elites, are examples of national security threats where the people and territory have been under contestation, and this threat was as a result of interruption by external forces. There is a need for social institutions that can deal with issues of national integration.

While considering the State's national security needs, it is critical to take a close look at its political institutions, such as the presidency and parliament, election

institutions, and political parties. Political leadership is very important in national security circles because there is a lot of decision making involved concerning domestic issues that may eventually become threats, foreign affairs and the diplomatic arena, which covers many aspects of diplomacy such as military, cultural, health, economics and trade immigration, and other issues such as the environment and diseases which According to (Ronald, 2011), it has been common to find African States or so-called developing States procuring arms that they have often paid for from suppliers who are normally European States, and due to institutional weaknesses, the suppliers of such arms give these arms to the African States in exchange for their domestic and foreign policies, which often lead to the surrender of the African States. This boldly demonstrates how political institutions, such as leadership, are important for national security, which includes people's well-being as a result of using the available resources within their boundaries. The presence of such leadership necessitates the establishment of strong institutions in which laws are enacted to change such leadership. The presence of parliament as an institution to make laws concerning the competition for political office becomes important in order to establish an electoral body or institution responsible for organizing free and fair elections, but regular elections that command citizens' legitimacy.

METHODOLOGY

The study was qualitative, based on observation and Documentation paradigms. Such techniques are recommended to be used in researches concerning observation of human behaviour in our personal and professional lives, (Creswell, 1998; Fetterman, 1998; Holloway, 1997.) From observation, the study generated explanations and understandings, and predictions supported with written documents and recordings. The study time scope was 1952 to 2020.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The findings on the State of Sudan's national security revealed the factors that threaten that security. These factors have been classified as social, political, economic, environmental, and military. It is important to note that Sudan's national security has been primarily threatened by critical security threats, which have since evolved into traditional security threats. The study looked into the nature of the State institutions inherited by Sudan's post-independence leaders and how they have aided in meeting the needs of citizens and the State. The nature of institutions built to protect national security cannot be thoroughly investigated unless the needs of the State and its citizens are examined. The investigator posed the

question of how national and international institutions have contributed to Sudan's security. The responses of inherited institutions designed to serve the interests of colonialists; institutions built on ethnic divisions, economic imperialism, and political authoritarianism, and designed to integrate colonies into an imperial domination of colonizing powers. Like the previous chapters, the issues raised were strengthened by the descriptions given by the respondents during the interviews and document analyses as follows;

Status of Sudan's institutions

While debating the causes of broad-spectrum State failure in Africa, Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill, and Rothschild, argued, that an investigation of the area's colonial antecedents was required to fully understand why States in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Sudan, are failing (Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill, and Rothschild, 1992). To them, the colonial State was nothing more than a military and administrative construct designed to extract resources for the mother nation's economic benefit. This colonial occurrence demonstrated an institutional structure in which an unaccountable foreign administration had concurrent decision-making and execution functions, thus rejecting the concept of separation of powers (Chazan, 1999). During the post-independence period, the colonialists' systems of force and administration were zealously suppressed, as were the pluralist institutions imposed by the colonialists during the pre-independence discussions (Gordon and Donald, 2006). This is similar to what (Chazan, 1999) describes. Alberto Pecoraro asserted that, while the colonial State was undemocratic or authoritarian in nature, it was fragile, and its attachment to African society was very limited, given that colonialists had little interest in the advancement of indigenous peoples and their lives (Pecoraro, 2012). In his submission, (Jonathan, 2008) States that when investigating the functioning of the polity's sub-system and its non-State counterparts, it is critical to investigate the progression of ability, which can include the capability and competencies of the workforces as well as the institute culture in the State sub-system.

Given all of the foregoing, it is necessary to State unequivocally that the arrival of aliens at a time when the process of State formation was evolving disrupted the indigenous people's ability to build institutions to meet their needs. To make matters worse, those who disrupted the State formation process, which was also laying the groundwork for institutions, not only disrupted but also created institutions that were not intended to serve the indigenous people, but rather to exploit the resources in their spheres of influence. As a result of intimidation and force, local societies were discouraged from challenging the system. This did not strengthen the institutions, but

rather made them violent and weak. These are the institutions that the post-independence leaders inherited. For example, in an interview with one of the participating respondent (R1), it was revealed that all the above was in line with what one official intimated when he said that:

"The Sudanese State institutions are characterized by failure as a result of favouritism in the appointments ... There is no suitable person in the appropriate place in most of the institutions, there are employees who hold more than one job in the State, employees with less qualifications as a result of favouritism in appointment to the public position" (Interview in Khartoum, on 30th October, 2019).

The weakness of State institutions is undeniable, as demonstrated by (Jonathan, 2008) when attempting to define a failed State and characterized a failed State not with the force of violence but with the endurance in the face of that violence. It is not surprising that when he was giving examples of such States, he mentioned three: Angola, Burundi, and Sudan. It was also argued that the course of that aggression against the ruling regime or government, as well as the robust nature of the political and geographical needs for mutual power or sovereignty that rationalize that violence, classifies a failed State.

This demonstrates that the State of Sudan lacks the institutions to control the violence in Darfur, Kordofan (Nuba Mountains), and Blue Nile, as it did when South Sudan seceded from Sudan. The political and military institutions were unable to deal with what was going on in Sudan's political arena. This is consistent with what (Jonathan, 2008) Stated when he Stated that another indicator of a failed State is the inability to control the boundaries. He contends that there is frequently a loss of influence over portions of their territory, and that bureaucratic power can only be felt in the capital city and more ethnically specific regions. As previously Stated, this has occurred in many areas of Sudan, including Darfur, Abyei, the Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains.

The failure on the political institution level is consistent with what (Ronald, 2011) Stated when he argued that it is common to find African States acquiring arms that they have frequently rewarded for from suppliers who are generally Western States, and that due to institutional weaknesses, the suppliers of such arms give these arms to the African States in exchange for their dome. This explains the conflicts over resources that are surrendered to suppliers of arms used to fight insurgencies, which are caused by weaknesses in political institutions characterized by nepotism and ethnicity, which were built by colonialists through ethnic divisions. This is how a lack of political institutions can undermine national security.

This revelation demonstrates how political institutions, such as leadership, are critical for national security, which consists of bringing good leadership, which should feature able leadership rather than one based on ethnic

loyalties, nepotism, and patronage, as seen in Sudan, where people from the south, Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains were underrepresented.

Similarly, the concept of citizen protection as indicated in the social contract and even in circumstances where the use of force is used in a given territory demonstrates what (Baldwin, 1997) described as traditional security, which observes the necessity of the military as an institution to deal with threats that compromise the territorial integrity of the State has been weakened in Sudan. This is consistent with (Nesadurai, 2005) point of view.

The national security perspective is well known to be central in all other security requirements. For example, Nesadurai has attempted to use the national security standpoint, which focuses on the military threat from external forces, as the defining stance for other security aspects such as economic security. The Sudanese army is distinguished by ethnic characteristics, which has alienated some groups of people, and this is one of the reasons why the army employs brutal force in areas that would otherwise be integrated into one Sudan. This type of violence can be traced back to colonial police, who were designed to be violent in order to achieve the colonialists' goals. This has exacerbated the military's institutional weakness and, as a result, has jeopardized national security. While discussing the nature of the social institution, one participating respondent (R11) who was interviewed demonstrated how the social institutions were built on shaky foundations and thus could not guarantee the unity required for national security. The social fabric of the State of Sudan was compromised during the time when the aliens were busy creating an environment which would help them exploit the resources they needed in the area, and in his words the official stated that:

“The educational administration in the Ministry of Education is so weak because the former regime for the last thirty years was the reason for the destruction of the administration of the Ministry due to the appointment of loyalists to the regime and they are weak in efficiency, honesty and transparency (Corruption and nepotism). Those affiliated with the former ruling party (National Congress Party) are the authors of the ministry and workers for party lobbyists. There is only 2 to 3% of staff in the Ministry of Education are not members of the ruling regime, while the rest are spies of the ruling regime” (Interview in Khartoum, on 7th December, 2019).

While having another interview with another participating respondent (R19), the weakness of the social institution was again shown from another perspective, but a complimentary way. In this interview one elder indicated that:

“Today, the societies, especially in Western Darfur, for example, before the civil war, people were

homogeneous and were productive despite the fact that production is local ... But after the war has erupted, the communities are changed ... it was divided into tribes and quarrels which reached the level of gross violations of human rights. And there are officials and important people in the government, they commit crimes against some societies, and those crimes are practiced by the Arabs and they are protected by the different regimes since the independence. Societies at the rural level do not need anything from the central government than security and other basic needs as citizens. Wars will never stop unless those criminals are faced with justice.... there is a high level of hate and feeling of injustice among the citizens” (Interview in Khartoum, on 28th December, 2019).

These revelations demonstrate how the disruption of the process of State formation on the social level impacted the clear construction of social institutions that would have guaranteed societal and national security. This resulted in divisions and ill will among the various ethnic groups, resulting in weakened social institutions. Antonio (2012) argued that societies are directed by their culture and do whatever they do given their cultures' norms and values (Antonio, 2012). It is critical to recognize that the laws that progress in any given society are derived from the culture of a given people, and these laws are designed to strengthen people's unity. It is through such processes that national integration is formed, which ensures national security conclusively because citizens see themselves as members with similar values. It is no surprise that (Rajapaksa, 2011) defines security as the protection of societal norms, values, and institutions, and argues for their protection from military and non-military threats such as those posed by colonialists, who compromised the norms and values of Sudan's indigenous people, resulting in national insecurity.

Rotberg, (2011) in his article on institutional failure, argues, that nation States exist to provide political goods, security, education, health, economic opportunity, environmental monitoring, creating and implementing an institutional system, and providing and preserving infrastructure He goes on to list them as follows: security, institutions for controlling and resolving disagreements, rule of law, secure property rights, contract implementation, political involvement and social service distribution, infrastructure, and economic control (Rotberg, 2011). It could be argued that the emphasis on the institution is critical, and that if they are weak, all of this will be impossible to achieve, threatening national security. The institutions built prior to post-independence Sudan were not intended to provide these to local citizens, resulting in weak institutions designed for colonial exploitation of resources for the benefit of colonialists. Even where infrastructure was constructed, it was intended to exploit economic resources.

The weakened social institutions, such as religious

institutions, cultural institutions, schools, and universities, put in place studies that concretize the State's national security, were built on what the British and Turks left behind. The fact that the early civilizations in this area were so well-known on all of these grounds but were disrupted by the aliens is troubling enough. And the aliens' crisis is causing what (Gunaratna, 1998) describes as an ethnic crisis that has threatened Sudan's national security.

The economic institutions were not any better because the entire system that was built by the colonialists after disrupting the indigenous people's economic setup was in favor of the colonialists. While in an interview with another respondent (R22) she mentioned that, the nature of the economic institutions which are very instrumental in supporting other institutions was not organized to serve the people of Sudan! But the colonialists and their cronies! In the words of the interviewee, it was stated that:

“Using their policies, the colonists weakened Sudan socially and economically ... in order to facilitate their plundering of wealth, especially gold. The Mahdist Army in its composition was based on the slave traders. The railway in Sudan was created by the British to enter their forces into Sudan and transfer economic products ... also, the Economic Project was created to help the British financial treasury and to help the colonial administration that was run Sudan” (Interview in Darfur, on 4th December, 2019).

While the realist paradigm views national security through the lens of military force and State security, it does not emphasize the primacy of citizens or people who live within the territorial political space. The evolution of State security has demonstrated that security does not imply military hardware (Mcnamara, 1968). Security, according to McNamara, includes the protection of values, both economic and social. It is argued that economic strength is no longer limited to military hardware and military force, but that economic strength has become a key component of national security, necessitating the establishment of economic institutions to ensure national security.

The importance of economic institutions was also expressed by (Hyden, 2010), who argued that informal institutions have their roots in society, rather than the State, and generate a particular vibrancy to politics that may not be readily apparent where administrative institutions predominate. This implies that any investigation of African politics is flawed if it is analyzed as neutral on economy and society, particularly in Africa with a colonial past. As a result, it is reasonable to make such a distinction in all places where formal rubrics are present (Hyden, 2010). The idea of observing military strength and the use of economic institutions is in line with the theory of force (Tilly, 1975), as States formed through conquest frequently look at taxation of the

people to sustain the military.

It also appears to occur in social contract theorists, who accept to be taxed in exchange for State protection, and to the people they are under no obligation to offer security once they accept to pay taxes to the State. Economic institutions play an important role in national security. As a result, it can be argued that the economic institutions established by aliens could not support the military of post-independence African States such as Sudan. The infrastructure built was also intended to facilitate the export of goods to former colonies rather than African home industries. The integration of African economies into global trade benefits those who integrate African economies. With the depopulation of southern Sudan through slave trade during Turko-Egyptian rule, it is also difficult for a people who were traded in as slaves to consider an economic institution that would support Sudan's national security. This not only resulted in prejudices, hatred, and a loss of national integration; it also sowed the seeds of insecurity in Sudan, which led to the secession of South Sudan as an independent State on July 9, 2011.

This situation is consistent with what (Jean, 1969) describes as happening in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where Belgian economics did not serve the people of the Congo Free State. The literature on the Democratic Republic of the Congo is an example of a region that suffered the exploitation and cruelty of colonialists, such as Sudan, where slavery as an event had a significant impact. The incidents of resource exploitation and European cruelty when they landed in Africa demonstrate how State formation was sped up, and after integrating the Quasi-State in the European State system, the economic foundation of the African State that was created by the colonialists was not going to benefit the Africans in those artificially created States. As a result, States are unable to build economic institutions capable of ensuring the people's and the State's long-term survival. This eventually had an impact on these countries' national security.

National and international institutions contributing to national security of Sudan

Several authors, including Thouthal, (1974) and Charlotte Ng, (2008), have written about African States and their functioning, and there has been an argument that, if a comparison is made, there is a significant difference between the States in Europe and Africa in terms of their nature, the nature and character of the institutions, and the functioning of the institutions. It is argued that African States are characterized by a lack of a public realm, a lack of acceptability, a lack of national integration, self-enrichment, corruption, institutions that are weak, ineffective, and frequently feature nepotism (Charlotte Ng, 2008). In support of her analysis, Charlotte connects

the formation of African States with their national security, (Mohamed, 2013) also argues that, the abilities of the State in Africa are burdened by numerous issues and forces. Jackson and Rosberg, (1986) have indicated that the political and economic condition of the African States can only be observed in a form of “Juridical Statehoods” which means that, these States only gained constitutional independence because they were only getting accepted because they had some features which were similar to those States recognized under the Westphalian treaty of 1648 (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986). This reference to the African States as “Juridical Statehood” is evidence to the fact that African States like Sudan and their institutions therein, cannot operate like other States in the International system.

According to Charlotte Ng (2008), African States have States within States or other power centers within them, implying that they are not full-fledged States. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Libya, and Mali are all examples of what Charlotte is referring to. In Sudan, there are areas controlled by insurgents who have received support from their cousins across the border. For a long time, Joseph Kony received support from Sudan in what is known as tit-for-tat politics, in which sovereign States support rebellions in neighboring States. This situation was confirmed by the participating respondent (R14) who asserted that:

“There is a big difference in building and developing State institutions in the way that is found in Europe and those in Sudan ... In Europe, institutions are established according to the permanent country's constitution, while in Sudan according to the colonial agenda and/ or the different constitutions that been prepared by every ruling regime; you often find fraud in employments and corruption in the performance of the institutions.....the institutions serve a section of leaders and their ethnic groups and are used to silence those who are asking for a fair share of the national resources”(Interview in Khartoum, on 22nd December, 2019).

While several authors have demonstrated the differences between European and African State institutions, very little effort has been made to demonstrate the causes of these differences. It would be incorrect to claim that the process of State formation was linear, as well as to claim openly that the African State was the work of the European State. As a result, it can be argued that the national security of several African States whose State formation was disrupted has been repeatedly challenged by challenges to national integration. Insecurity has been characterized by ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in several African countries, including Sudan. Smith Dam has argued that ethnic conflict entails a sustained violent conflict of smaller groups of people with the goal of defying the sovereigns in these States and causing a change in the status quo (Smith, 2001). This is common

in Africa, where the political map of Africa was drawn by aliens, and certain ethnicities have frequently fought governments whose institutions have not provided them with justice, services, or public goods, and they are not involved in decision-making processes as European institutions have. These ethnic conflicts have triggered not only an insecurity crisis in Africa, but also a threat to national security. As a result, it is critical to examine the differences between the historical perspective and the current international system, in which the powerful invaded the weak using force and established critical structural foundations in the weak, exposing them to national security threats. This is backed up by research showing how divide and rule policies damaged societal unity during colonial times (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011), even political parties established in some States like Sudan where parties like the Umma party were created (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011). This exposes the State to societal vulnerabilities that threaten national security as ethnic tensions intensify within institutions like the army and other government sectors where nepotism and corruption thrive. This was either done on purpose to benefit colonialists by making their job of administering Sudan easier, or it later became the foundation of threats to national security in many African countries. Such a situation could not have occurred in European countries.

It is not surprising that once societal security was threatened by events such as the slave trade, economic institutions had no chance of survival. Ethnicity is a precursor to nepotism and corruption, both of which are known to be detrimental to institutional growth and the provision of public goods and infrastructure (Jonathan, 2008). As a result, it is not difficult to find examples in Sudan where ethnicity led to flaws in the creation of institutions that would be useful to the military and other institutions tasked with protecting national security.

Prior to the deposition of the former president of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir, the situation in Sudan indicated a serious breakdown of institutions, where people could no longer afford bread, they could not earn enough money, and a State known for oil could not provide fuel to citizens (Hassan and Kodouda, 2019), and the situation in Sudan is even worse now. These are all indicators of the disparity between European and Sudanese institutions. This situation exemplifies what (Jonathan, 2008) discussed when defining a crisis State, arguing that the type of State is facing a severe tension in which the existing institutions are dealing with a dangerous situation and may be powerless to deal with the devastation and conflict. He went on to say that at this point, the most imminent danger is State collapse, as Sudan experienced when it couldn't decide who would be the leader of the government. While this is not a complete scenario, it is a scenario in which a State is experiencing a crisis and either recovers from it or remains in that situation for an extended period of time, during which the

State can actually collapse. Interestingly, Johnson Di John made Statement which explained a scenario which happened in Sudan when he argued that, such a process could lead to the formation of another State, to warfare, and disorder, but in the case of Sudan a certain time of crisis led to the formation of South Sudan as a new State. This made the institutions in Sudan are very different from those in Europe showing that the State institutions in Sudan could not hold off national security threats as those in Europe.

The major features of the State institutions in Sudan

While Moore, (1966); Charles, (1990); Cramer, (2006) all agree that the course of State formation is peppered with conflict, bloodshed, forcefulness and vagueness over the institutional systems as different groups of people contest to set up places of authority and acceptability, little has been said about how this type of situation has affected the institutional structure that is evident in African States like Sudan. While debating State institutions in Africa, Rache Ellett, has argued that in several African States, the most essential institutions that are thought to be the ones responsible for constructing, arranging and control the political and economic accomplishments are largely weak and in certain occasions are in a condition where they can hardly operate or function as they are supposed to do (Ellett, 2008). The examples that show the State of dysfunction were given by Nganje, (2014) and they include situations where the judiciary is not independent, and therefore cannot guarantee regard for the rule of law, assure security and stability, and guarantee that agreements are respected. This line of thinking was confirmed by the assertions that were delivered in an interview that was held by one of the participating respondent (R16) when she observed that:

“It is common to find the judiciary in Sudan to work depending on the will of the powerful in this country. The big people in government cannot have their tribesmen to be taken to court and they get sentenced. The poor and those that come from wrong ethnic groups will be the ones that will serve in prisons and even then, people have been killed anyhow by people who are powerful in security institutions. This affects the acceptability of the courts which are institutions that help in governance and that is why there is impunity everywhere” (Interview in Khartoum, on 24th December, 2019).

The results from the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), also revealed that the institutions in Sudan do not serve the entire population or the citizens of Sudan, but these institutions have been built to serve those in government and their ethnicities. This also influenced the way the work of the institutions is done and how the people in these institutions are recruited. For example, in the outskirts of Khartoum in one of the FGDs, one

respondent commented that:

“The way people are recruited into these institutions will immediately tell you that the institutions are not going to serve Sudanese people but a small group of people and their interests. This does not only end in the army as an institution but almost every institution including one where you would not expect such bad nepotism and favouritism, the education institutions. What is happening is troubling. Ask any of the people in South Sudan before it seceded” (Focus Group Discussion, 20th December, 2019)

In another interview in Darfur, another participating respondent's (R23) view of the institutions did not differ so much from what was discussed by the respondent in Khartoum. The official in one of the institutions described these institutions and he said that:

“The main features of State institutions in Sudan are institutions that are not stable, not highly efficient, not effective, abstract, and fixed to the extent required. Therefore, they have so far failed to provide services that the Sudanese citizen is satisfied with and maintains his security and the security of Sudan” (Interview in Darfur, on 4th February, 2020).

Staffan Linberg, for one, contends that, while most African countries, including Sudan, support the principle of separation of powers (Linberg, 2009). He goes on to discuss how legislatures are very fragile in their representation, oversight, and legislative roles that implement extremes, administrative flaws, and political isolation are other features that are common in many African States' institutions. What Staffan Lindberg claims is identical to what happened in Sudan during the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian eras. This period was marked by poor representation on the part of the people of southern Sudan. The educational institutions favored the people of the north, and there was no justice for the enslaved. This explains why everything that happened in Sudan has been passed down to modern Sudan, because external and internal pressures continue to shape the functioning of institutions in Sudan and Africa as a whole (Nganje, 2014).

Corruption and military leadership are two characteristics of Sudanese State institutions that have made it difficult for the State to function effectively (Pinau, 2014). To further explain the question of the weakness of the institution of the presidency and leadership, (Oluwole and Bissessar, 2014) have argued that the storming of the military into State headship functions through military takeover has exacerbated the problem of State failure. This has been a long-standing practice in Sudan, where military men and coups are common. They also argue that corruption in African institutions is an indication of post-colonial leadership dysfunction, but this does not absolve the colonialists, who were the true architects of

corruption and bribery through manipulations of local leaders and the use of gifts meant to allow them to expropriate Africa's resources. According to (Oluwole and Bissessar, 2014), this was a "international abuse of power." The existence of slavery in southern Sudan confirms this type of institutional failure in Sudan, where the colonial State was unable to protect the people in the south; they were unable to obtain justice because they were perceived as inferior to the Arabs used by the British. The Arabs adopted the same attitude as the British. This resulted in societal insecurity, which eventually led to national insecurity. Therefore, the question of State formation is one that is seen as partly a reason for institutional failure. In confirmation of the above, one participating respondent (R15) said that:

"These military leaders in Sudan cannot handover power of the presidency because of the fear to be investigated. The former president Omar Al-Bashir was found with millions of Dollars and it is not clear whether he can be prosecuted because the men in courts are his men. A man who has been in power for this long, has his cronies in almost every institution which would otherwise bring justice and correct what went wrong. These military men who have captured power will not hand him to competent courts" (Interview in Khartoum, on 22nd December, 2019).

This assertion reveals, and is similar to what Oluwole and Bissessar (2014) argued when they argued that the militarization of political institutions not only weakened these institutions, but also harmed the military institutions by ensuring that men from the ethnic groups of military leaders were placed at the helm of the posts in the army to defend the country. It is also no secret that in Sudan, military personnel were assigned to other institutions even when they lacked the necessary qualifications. This was a paraphrase of what colonialists did when they chose anyone who would serve their interests. This militarization has contributed to the institutionalization of corruption in several African countries. By having such a situation, a nexus of military leadership-bad governance-and-institutional failure was established in African countries such as Sudan.

While some authors continue to write that post-colonial rulers were successful in eliminating or disregarding the checks and balances that existed prior to independence, this is only partially true because colonial masters never instituted democratic systems, and some authors try to paint that kind of picture. There is a very negative picture of what happened in colonial States, where people were hanged, executed, or deported under the watchful eye of colonialists (Asafa, 2015). These occurrences do not demonstrate that pre-independence African States were fundamentally different from post-independence African States. While colonialists wielded enormous power and influence in pre-independence African States, they were able to suffocate the process of State formation, which

would have resulted in African-friendly institutions that would have served the people's national security needs.

The uniqueness of the institutions of the State of Sudan stems from the fact that Sudan has been characterized by military men who have occupied the institution of the presidency and used their office and influence to place military men and tribesmen in other institutions such as the army to serve their interests, much like the Colonialists. As a result, Sudan's institutions are weak and dysfunctional. As a result, there are more threats to national security and human security.

Respondents' views on foreign governments and their effect on building of State institutions in Sudan

States emerge from situations associated with conquest and domination, according to (Carneiro, 1970). These were some of the premises upon which he built his conquest theory, which was advanced to provide a more valuable and well-defined perception of State formation, which was debated as having resulted from a variety of factors that shaped the groundwork of the conquests. Agriculture, warfare, and irrigation were among the factors considered, and Carroll, (2009) Carroll Paul emphasizes the force theory, which is based on States progressing out of military maneuvers (CarrollPaul, 2009). This military is regarded as the most important factor before mutual understanding, as discussed in the social contract theory. This understanding is frequently shared by the military and the vanquished subjects. It is also argued that the military factor will generate a link between citizen protection and the collection of taxes from citizens for that protection.

While all of this can be linked to the formation of States in Africa, particularly, Sudan, many authors have not linked colonial military conquest and dominance to the formation of the colonial State in Africa. Most literature on State formation has been based on the European State, with very little relating to the African State, which has the true features of alien domination and brutality as seen in Namibia, with the Germans, the Ndebele in present-day Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo under Belgian rule, to name a few (Fischer-Tine and Gehrman, 2009). In addition to the foregoing, the acquisition of territory necessitates the establishment of administrative accountability, which includes the police or security of the territory and the population in the conquered territory.

The presence of necessities from the conqueror's side and necessities from the vanquished's side in the territory creates a situation of mutual understanding between the two sides. What is not mentioned here is the situation in which the conqueror is not interested in the area, but only in what the vanquished have, as was the case with colonialists in Sudan and many other African countries.

Without becoming interested in such a scenario, it is difficult to see how the alien rulers influenced the

establishment of State institutions. It is in this context that one can understand why the colonialists were unable to establish institutions to combat them. In such circumstances, they placed a greater emphasis on divide and rule, which deepened or exacerbated ethnic divisions that existed prior to the arrival of colonialists (Tharoor, 2017). In one of the interviews that were conducted, the participating respondent (R26) stated that:

“Foreign rulers like the Turks, Egyptians and the British are the ones who created some institutions in Sudan, but imagine how these people could build institutions to help us to defend ourselves against them. Whatever they built was meant for their interests and it lastly and accidentally helped us if it did. Look at education, economics and the military. Can they give you latest machines to fight them? This is it” (Interview in Khartoum, on 23rd January, 2020).

Undoubtedly, the institutions that were inherited at independence were a reflection of the foundation that was built by the colonialists. In their article, “How Colonial rule committed Africa to fragile authoritarianism... the first rigged elections held on the continent were those organized by Britain and France... Colonialism reinforced authoritarian elements in African Societies while undermining the inclusion and accountability that once balanced them”, (Cheeseman and Fisher (2019). The submission on the occurrences of the bad practices by the aliens who came to the area occupied by present day Sudan and copied by the natives and mentioned in the documentaries and respondents were revealed in the expressions by the participants of the Focus Group Discussion during the exercise of data gathering from areas of Nubian mountains and Darfur. For example in one of the FGD that was held, a participant submitted that:

“Segregation, religious intolerance, ethnic marginalization, dehumanizing of some groups of people in Sudan were copied from the aliens who did not mind the local people because they knew they were not going to be here for long. What the rulers of post-independence Sudan did not know was that for them they were part of the people they were ruling, they became corrupt, and they killed, they grabbed resources became rich and very arrogant like the foreign leaders. They became a distinct class of people and they felt Sudan and the people inside it were their belonging” (Focus Group Discussion, 12th November 2019).

This revelation is visible not only in the political arena, but also in other areas of concern to the Copenhagen school when they identified the sources of security threats, which included the environment, political, social, economic, and military. The alien rule in Sudan had an impact on all of these sectors. Slavery in the social sector is not a hidden fact, and it persisted even when many

authors in the social contract theory discussed protection (Chuei, 2009). In terms of education, they created separate systems for the north and south, further dividing the country. This is consistent with what Anders et al., (2014) Stated when they argued that the language, religion, and education systems in Sudan differed between the north and south. This arrangement could not support unity, but threaten national integration and national security (Anders et al., 2014). One of the participating respondents (R27) was more concerned with the economic effect of the foreign rulers on the building of the institutions in Sudan, and in his observation narrated that:

“On the economic side of the foreign colonizer, and although it has set up some projects such as textiles and agricultural projects, such as the Al-Jazeera Project, it has plundered the country's wealth. On the social sector: The colonizer came with a new culture in the field of food and introduced the English food culture ... and these were all new things for the Sudanese people” (Interview in Khartoum, on 10th February, 2020).

Another official (R3) who was interviewed in Khartoum who commented on the issue of alien effect on the building of institutions confirmed that the effect was not good, and in his words, he said that:

“Because of those who have been in charge, are from one side (Northerners). Education is confined to specific areas ... favouritism among officials, especially ministers, governed by specific Jellaba families (Shawayga, Gaalyeen, and Danagla) in a very clear way ... for example my file is in the department, and I do not have a job opportunity in Khartoum ... as a result of racism, the rulers are in control and we are Darfurians No job opportunities in the capital (Khartoum) a section of people in the north was left with economic power and the south was abandoned at the mercy of the people of the north” (Interview in Khartoum, on 7th November, 2019).

In his concluding remarks the official (R3) said that:

“During the Turkish period, Turkish changed the system of governance to align it with what would serve its agenda. As for the British, they divided Sudan into provinces and semi-States to weaken the State of Sudan” (Interview in Khartoum, on 7th November, 2019).

The revelation from all of the respondents' opinions is supported by the arguments of Daron Acemoglu, (1961), who argued that the poverty in Africa, which has been debated in many forums, can be traced back to European rule in Africa. Other authors, such as (Daron and Robinson, 2012), who focus on the colonial impact on the economic situation and institutions in the post-colonial period, do not disagree with this line of thought.

This has been the focus of theoretical and ideological debates in the past about Africa's economic advancement. It is worth noting that the Europeans did not come to Africa to build institutions that would allow them to live a respectable life; they came to extract resources, and the institutions that were established were to aid in that endeavor, and these were the ones that were passed down to the people who came after them at the time of independence. These were to be a threat to the national security of the Sudanese State and other States that shared features of the colonial institutional structure.

As a result, it is possible to argue that there was no symbiotic relationship between Sudanese citizens and the colonialists who were ostensibly the conquerors, as hypothesized by the conquest theory. If such a relationship existed, some form of contract theory would have resulted, and the conquerors would have protected the people of southern Sudan. It is at this point that one can assert that the shortcomings in this relationship harmed Sudan's national security.

The permanent constitution and the guaranteed functioning of the State institutions in Sudan

The constitution is a vital legal document that serves as the supreme law of the land. It reflects the consensus of all the people who live in a polity. Political communities, it has been argued, begin as social communities and then evolve into States. Antonio (2012) contends that communities are guided by their culture and do whatever they do given their cultures' norms and values (Antonio, 2012). These values, norms, and customs are transformed into laws, which are written down in constitutions. This is consistent with what (Kofi, 2016) argued when he stated that constitutions made in African States are aware of, and support or encourage, traditional and customary habits and systems. This implies that constitutions are a reflection of people's norms, customs, values, and traditions. In these circumstances, constitutions written in a foreign language are a misnomer, just as they have been in many African countries where so many people are unable to read and understand their own constitutions. This may explain why people in such countries are not connected to and aligned with their countries' values.

According to Bulmer, (2017), constitutions serve a number of purposes, including the declaration and definition of the political community. It is also argued that a constitution distinguishes between those who live within and outside the boundaries of a State. The State's boundaries may be geographical, but they also specify the rights to any other extraterritorial rights and personal rights as a citizen. This is significant in the sense that those who live within a given territory must be protected as stipulated by the constitution following an agreement

between the ruled and the rulers. This is what Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke envisioned in the social contract. In addition to the foregoing, constitutions define the character and power of the political community, as well as the basic principles and assumptions of the State, without overlooking where sovereignty rests, most notably in the people of the State (Bulmer, 2017). While it is true those constitutions specify citizens' rights and duties in determining and controlling the community's political institutions, it is also important to note that constitutions describe the various institutions of government, advising on their composition, powers, and functions. This study also acknowledges that constitutions establish or determine the legislature, executive, and judicial institutions of the State. Important for this study is the fact that constitutions specify how heads of State are elected, such as the electoral process and its integrity.

Not only that, but Elliot Bulmer (2017) emphasized that constitutions include provisions for accountability and transparency in relation to those in power, such as the ombudsman. It is also worth noting that constitutions specify the mechanisms for power transfer and how power is shared, as well as the declaration of the State's official spiritual identity.

In light of the above, Sudan has also had number of transitory constitutions right from the time when it got its independence in 1956, but despite that the leaders in Sudan have either abandoned these constitutions or they have abrogated them thereby making the institutions stipulated under those constitutions are weak and useless. Certainly, in confirming this view one participating respondent (R17) narrated that:

“There is no permanent constitution in Sudan till now, and any government that comes to power will be having its own constitution after amending the constitution that overturned against it. Therefore, Sudan needs a permanent constitution to be sought by the people and the constitution that no one overturns whatever governments change” (Interview in Darfur on 4th December, 2020).

Another participating respondent also showed dissatisfaction on the constitution of the Republic of Sudan in relation to the institutions which are created by the constitution. In a tone which was not so different from the first respondent, the respondent (R27) from Darfur intimated that:

“There is no consensus and agreed constitution from the Sudanese people in order to guarantee the work of the State of Sudan institutions in a stable manner. What is present now is a constitutional document which is not agreed upon by the Sudanese people or even from the parties that signed the document! So, you have to

imagine the scale of the tragedy in Sudan” (Interview in Darfur, on 10th February, 2020).

The revelations above show how the State institutions cannot function very well. The situation in Sudan can also be traced from the culture of the colonial State which laid the ground for the post-independent State. The colonial masters did not put up constitutions which would stipulate the rights of citizens, even in the event that some institutions like those in Sudan where there was the governor, this governor was not native and therefore, there was no way he was going to rule the people that did not share culture norms and values. When it came to the people of South Sudan, those would see the governor once in a year (Chuei, 2009). According to the Institute of Democracy and Electoral assistance it is written that:

“From 1983 to 1997, the country was divided into five regions in the north and three in the south, each headed by a military governor. After a military coup in 1985, regional assemblies were suspended. With the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation abolished in 1993 by Al-Bashir, and the ruling National Islamic Front changed its name to the National Congress Party (NCP), the new party included some non-Muslim members; mainly Southern Sudanese politicians, some of whom were appointed as ministers or State governors”.

While the constitutional institutions have been created in Sudan, there is a need to look at their functioning and then investigate why the constitution has not guaranteed the functioning of these institutions. The problem could be that before the process of making is undertaken, there is the aspect of citizenship agreeing on how the polity is going to be governed and once the identity, national integration and citizenship are not settled, it becomes hard to have a respected constitution. The failure to have a respected constitution signifies the fact of failure in having citizens to agree on how they want to be governed and protected.

According to Neill Nugent, the productive contract exists in situations where the sovereign discusses with people or the ruled in a given geographical area (Nugent, 2010). This discussion covers the issues of how the protection of the ruled is going to be done by the sovereign. This further implies that issues of rights and freedoms will be debated, the elements of taxes, the right over resources like land are debated.

Even when Nugent, (2010) argued that, there are three categories of contract including, the coercive, productive and permissive categories of contract, there is a point when the ruler and the ruled agree on certain issues. He discusses coercive social contracts, where the right to dominate or rule is based on the capacity of the sovereigns to make unbearable the survival of their subordinates. This is how the argument reveals how some authors did not consider the African States context

in showing the poor foundation on which constitutions and constitutionality were built thereby ignoring the historical and anthropological past. The militarism that is practiced by coup leaders in Sudan is a replica of the militarism that was exercised by the colonialists. This history explains why constitutions cannot guarantee the functioning of the institutions because there is no history of constitutionalism. It is also important to say that the way the colonialists subjugated the African people, was picked on by many leaders who were involved in coups slightly after independence. They had learnt lessons of impunity from the colonialists.

The nature and character of the colonial State in relation to how constitutions could guarantee institutional functioning can be confirmed by the arguments made by (Raymond, 2004) when he observed that the colonial State in Africa had features of totalitarianism, it was an unbending instrument of dominance and was not for all the time it existed an institution of democracy as planned by the colonialists. This is what was bequeathed to the leaders who came after the colonialists and they had no reason for supporting constitutions to guarantee the functioning of institutions.

The characterization of the concept “institution” can be difficult, but if one uses the description given by (Hyden, 2010), it can be argued that institutions are rubrics that are unbroken by citizens or a given society over a long period of time to bring about a transformation to specific members (North, 1989). In essence, this means that institutions exist in every State, but their nature and operation differ. What matters is that institutions are formed from a collection of ethnic or traditional standards and customs that a specific society regards as essential to its survival.

The survival of society is linked to the survival of the State, and the reverse may also be true, because people live in polities whose boundaries are defined by constitutions. The constitutions define and declare what institutions do, and whatever is declared there is because humans are an end in relation to the functions of the institutions, not a means to an end.

All institutions in any given polity derive power from society, and when that society is fractured and weak as a result of nepotism, tribalism, and corruption, the institutions will reflect that society as well. When such vices exist, patronage grows, and leaders frequently force other people to make transactions that benefit leaders while citizens do not receive what is rightfully theirs. In a polity in which leaders view themselves selfishly in comparison to all citizens, no strong economic institutions will exist, and as a result, the institutions will be unable to protect citizens and the State. This is due to the fact that institutions are designed for national security rather than personal security. This is because institutions are created for national security not personal security. While in an interview with one of the participating respondent (R25), one official stated that:

“The State institutions have failed so far to ensure the security of the State and the citizen ... and will not guarantee security, neither for the State nor for the Sudanese citizen” (Interview in Darfur, on 1st February, 2020).

Another participating respondent (R23) on his part observed and said that:

“Over the years after the independence, the institutions in Sudan have failed to guarantee the security of the Sudanese citizens and the nation as a whole ... although the State institutions operate to the best of their capacity, but because they are not unanimous, and the racism, regionalism, and cronyism that practiced in the institutions, are the ones that kept these institutions from providing security to the citizens and the State of Sudan” (Interview in Darfur, on 4th February, 2020).

The protection of the citizens by institutions invokes the types of threats that arise against the citizens. According to Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap De Wilde the threats can arise from the societal, environmental, economic, political and military, and therefore the institutions that are created should guard against the threats that arise from such aspects. While it can be argued that States have institutions, these institutions cannot be the same because different societies value different things. In contemporary Africa, the institutions that were built had external influence that is why many are written in English or other foreign language. In situations where State formation was done by aliens it meant that the economic, social, political, environmental, and military institutions that were created could not easily protect the citizens.

The idea of protecting citizens in a polity confirms what (Baldwin, 1997) labeled as ‘traditional security’ which considers the institution of the military as in a State to deal with threats from the threats posed by external military threats. The military institution however, cannot protect citizens when the economic institution is not working well that is why McNamara, (1986) argued that security does not refer to military hardware alone. In her debate it is indicated that security encompasses the preservation of norms, values and customs or traditions and culture in relation to other aspects of life like economic and social, political and environment. The expressions by McNamara have not only contained economic potency in military machinery and military force, economic strength been recognized as a central element of national security and therefore, the need to have economic institutions to guarantee the security of citizens and State or national security.

The failure of the institutions to protect the citizens and the national security in Sudan and in the Africa, cannot be debated without looking and considering the past including the aspects of colonialism with all its evils. The occurrences in the international system like slave trade

and colonialism interrupted the preservation of the process of State formation which would have built institutions which were unique in the protection of the Sudanese and Africans. The sins of the past which have threatened the security of citizens include corruption in Sudan and Africa and while debating the weaknesses of the institutions in Africa Osoba, (1996) argued that corruption indicates an occurrence in a society which was severely embedded in the course of colonization.

Beneath thoughtful examination, it can be argued that the State institutions of Sudan like in many African societies and States cannot guarantee the security of the citizens because the institutions are weak because they were built on a weak foundation of ethnicity, corruption, weak constitutions which do not reflect the national integration in those States. It is known that constitutions show aspects of the lives of people from an agreement made by people on how they will be governed and once that is not there or it is not respected, the institutions will be weak, dysfunctional and therefore, cannot protect both the State and the citizens.

In this kind of situation which befell in Africa, power is built on personal levels rather than institutions based, therefore the State functions in a much more unstable and problematic setting than in States where power has been built to be official.

Weaknesses of Sudan’s State institutions connected to lack of realm, lack of legitimacy, absence of national integration, self-enrichment, and corruption

In his article “Peace Without Unity: The Dilemma of Reconciling Divergent Perspectives in Post-Conflict Sudan”, Atta El-Battahani, argued that in circumstances like those in Sudan where the course of State formation was yet to be fully grown, the components of multiplicity work in the direction of fragmentation and collapse than amalgamation (El-Battahani, 2008). Atta El-Battahani then asked a question regarding what causes harmony in circumstances of multiplicity. Such a question could not be answered without referring to the aspect of State formation in Sudan. According to (Carroll, 2009), the formation of the State is founded on States arising out of military expeditions or conquests. It can be argued that the military force has often led to the subjugation of the people who in the latter stage agree to pay taxes for the protection that is offered by the military. At the same time, the conquest of the territory finally calls for other administrative responsibilities which include police or security of the territory and the population in the area which has been dominated by the conquerors. The existence of the needs from the conqueror’s side and the need from the side of the conquered in the territory creates a situation of mutual understanding between the two sides.

The mutual understanding that could be expressed in

form of the contract theory will stipulates that the State formed out of the existence of a contract between people and the sovereign which exists at a given time in a given area. According to Nugent (2010), it is argued that there are three categories of contract, to him; he looks at the colonial period as his starting point to the current situation and he puts forward the coercive, productive and permissive categories of contract (Nugent, 2010). In his argument a coercive social contract, represents one where the right to dominate or rule is grounded on the ability of the sovereigns to make unbearable the survival of their subordinates. This argument reveals how some authors did not look at African States as having the historical and anthropological background. It is at the same time reveals that, the dominant rulers had a right over the subordinates in Africa. While discussing the State formation in Sudan one participating respondent (R2) stated that:

“The weakness of the State institutions as a result (Lack of transparency, lack of observation and accountability, personal interests that always overwhelm the interests of the State from those who involved in the management of the public affairs, the absence of the real role that the relevant institutions should play, and the involvement of the security and intelligence services in the management of the public institutions) have a strong and direct relationship with national insecurity, weakening national sovereignty, leading to weak national unity, and causing widespread of corruption” (Interview in Khartoum, on 2nd November, 2019).

A good amount of literature about State formation has focused on the State in Europe and the few that have documented about State formation in Africa have tried to argue that societies in Africa did not show signs of institutional development. However, some authors like Mengisteab Kendane have refuted such assertions and have argued that, African societies in the pre-colonial era exhibited political, economic and social institutions with a rich tradition of allocating resources, making laws and social control. It is therefore, important to point out that Africa and Europe shared some similarities and differences in the process of State formation. It is also important to note that many States in Africa, whether decentralized or centralized, had States that were formed before colonialism, though many authors do not acknowledge this (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007).

Sudan and the gaining of constitutional independence

In the works of La verle (2015), it is revealed that Sudan obtained its independence minus a lasting constitution in its place; Sudan had a constituent Assembly adopt the Transitional constitution that swapped the governor general as the sovereign with a five member commission

that was chosen by parliament (LaVerle, 2015). This poorly constituted institution gave executive powers to the prime minister. This situation is described by La verle (2015) in the following words: Although, it achieved independence without conflict, Sudan inherited many problems from the Condominium. One of the most important was the status of the civil service. The government placed Sudanese in the administration and provided compensation and pensions for British officers of the Sudan Political Service who left the country; it retained those who could not be replaced, mostly technicians and teachers. Southerners resented the replacement of British administrators in the South with Sudanese from the North. Many Southern leaders, opposed to violence, hoped to win constitutional concessions as a bulwark against what they perceived as Arab imperialism. Most Southerners supported provincial autonomy and warned that failure to win legal concessions would drive the South to rebellion” (Berry, 2015). The revelation above shows what occurred immediately after the departure of the British, and the Egyptians but what was left in terms of a constitution which spells out the building of institutions was not satisfactory in relation to the national security of the State. The society was divided as shown by La verle, (2015), and the people of the south perceived the north as representatives of imperialism. This implies that the British were not prepared to build institutions, though they found societies which were going through a State formation process (Carroll, 2009) using the military means or force. The Africans who were left with a structure built by the British could not use it to achieve the security needs of the citizens. One participating respondent (R6) who was answering a question on this narrated that:

“The British colonizer promised the Sudanese religious and social leaders to give Sudan its independence and kept its promise. The religious sects/ denominations and civil administrations in Sudan went to congratulate the Allies during the Second World War, and then the British government promised that if they won the war, they would give Sudan independence and it was. And independence was a queen’s reward for sectarianism in Sudan” (Interview in Khartoum, on 11th November, 2019).

Another respondent (R8) who was also answering the same question stated that:

“The foreign colonizer is the one that decided to leave Sudan at great risk. Although there have been resistance movements that had limited impact, but they are not the direct cause” (Interview in Khartoum, on 30st November, 2019).

The revelation from the respondents paints a picture of a

gloomy picture of Sudan after the departure of the British and the Egyptians. This implies that the British did not prepare the people of Sudan for self-governance since at a certain time they were not sure whether they were going to integrate southern Sudan with East Africa or the north of Sudan (Chuei, 2009). This confusion about the State of Sudan rhymes with the literature that has been written about the State in Africa. This literature ignored the Africa before the colonialists and the politics that existed before. This is why they only talk about the colonial State.

In her discussion about State formation, (Charlotte Ng, 2008) observes the clear differences in the processes of State formation in Africa and Europe. In her discussion, she notes the long historical process which had material, social epistemic adaptation, and strategy which she does not seem to give to the African process. It is also noted that in her discussion she brings out the fact that the product of sovereignty was indigenous, which came as a result of violent warfare which was disgusting, while at the same time having trials and failures in the process of political and social activities which also mean a lot in the building of political communities.

Institutional Building in Sudan and Its Effect on National Security

It becomes important to observe that Africa had its type of governance culture in the period before the coming of the colonialists, which during this contact with the outside world was destroyed by the effects of slavery, colonialism and the new wave of the latest form of colonialism (Farah, 2011). While debating the same (Wyk, 2007) attractively observed that the modern African State is a leftover of a past colonial State with a system and institutions forced on the Africans. In the confusion that was created by the colonial interruption of the process of State formation the African leaders picked on a colonial built system which led to tribal and cultural divisions and totalitarian grounded values (Farah, 2011). It is not by coincidence that the colonial powers were not attracted to building democratic institutions in Africa nor they were ready to train the new African leaders in what they deemed important for the type of Westphalian State they had in Europe. When interviewed about institutional building and how that process affected national security one of the officials (R1) lamented that:

State institutions in Sudan were established on the basis of favouritism and exclusion and the empowerment of certain regional, tribal, and sectarian groups ... Therefore, they failed to provide national security for the State of Sudan" (Interview in Khartoum, on 30st October, 2019).

The lamentations that were expressed by one of the participating respondents (R21) were not in isolation

because another participating respondent in Khartoum also observed that:

"Building institutions by the colonial administration is negatively affecting the national security of the State of Sudan. And now it is difficult to change or liberate institutions from sectarianism and build modern State institutions. All these civil wars are caused by the fact that there are sects/ denominations that have governed in Sudan and marginalized others. And these others are now trying to liberate the homeland from the grip of these sectarians. And the failed one went to form its own State like South Sudan" (Interview in Khartoum, on 10th January, 2020).

In the urge to comprehend the trials facing Sudan and Africa, there is need to note that while Africa tries to profit from continuous development, there is necessity to put under consideration not only the institutions but effort should also be made in trying to understand what these institutions do to the practice of power. Unofficial institutions have their foundation in society instead of the State and produce a specific vibrancy to politics that cannot easily be evident where official institutions are domineering (Hyden, 2010). The economic institutions which are thought to get power from the society often end up being weak either because of nepotism, tribalism and corruption. Where such evils do crop up, patronage evolves when the leaders use other people to do business on their behalf and then taxes are not paid and the leaders and the compromised conduits of wealth end up becoming weak. In such instances no strong economic institutions can be built for national security. In this kind of situation which befell Africa power is built on personal levels rather than institutions based, therefore the State functions in a much more unstable and problematic setting than in States where power has been built to be official.

It is also important to argue that the laws that evolve in any given society emanate from the culture of a given people and these laws are made to enhance the unity of people. It is from such processes that national integration is shaped which finally guarantees national security when people look at themselves as sharing similar values. In (Rajapaksa, 2011) definition of the concept of security, there is the preservation of norms, values, and institutions of the society, he goes ahead to show that there is need to protect all these from military and non-military threats. Social institutions like religious institutions, cultural institutions, schools and universities put in place studies which concretize the national security of the State.

According to Gunaratna, (1998), an ethnic crisis can be a threat to national security. He takes the historical dimension of this crisis as an important aspect of the relationship between ethnicity and national security. This implies that it is not only external military threats that

have threatened the national security of the African State. In some cases, one will argue that the State formation process in the African setting was and is still responsible for ethnic confrontations that are exposed in the African States.

Colonialism and the national integration problem

Regardless of the fact that social institutions form the base of any society and provide for the other institutions, they have been either neglected or they were destroyed by the colonial masters through dividing up people in the African context. In every State, the laws that are made in those States reflect the cultures and values of the people in that State. These laws enhance the national unity or integration of people. It is from such processes that national integration is shaped which finally guarantees national security when people look at themselves as sharing similar values. If one is to define the concept of security, it is important to recognize the preservation of norms, values, and institutions of the society (Rajapaksa, 2011). It is also important to note that there is the need to protect all these from military and non-military threats. Cultural institutions, religious, schools, and the traditional institutions support national integration and subsequently support the national security of any given State.

In many States ethnic crises have been disastrous national security threats (Gunaratna, 1998). The historical dimension of an ethnic crisis is a critical aspect of the relationship between ethnicity and national security. It is important to recognize that it is not only external threats that threaten the national security of States. When one looks closely at the African States, ethnic conflicts have proved the above and the cases from Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi, in Nigeria between the Hausa and the Fulani are examples. In some cases, one will argue that the State formation process in the African setting was and is still responsible for ethnic confrontations that have exposed in the African States. The invasion that occurred on the African continent by the Europeans led to the artificial separation of people who were supposed to be a nation. By doing that national integration was compromised and this has been one of the causes of insecurity in many African States. In relation to the above, the participating respondent (R4) in Khartoum who was interviewed on the same issue intimated that:

“The problem of national unity arose out of the colonizer. Because it handed the powers and institutions of the State to the sectarians in Sudan ... and this sectarianism is one-way in Sudan, which is northern Sudan... and they tried to control the resources and power of governance in Sudan throughout this period from independence to the moment. And they controlled the country's resources and national capabilities were concentrated in the centre. The Northerners failed to distribute power and wealth fairly

and in a justice way in Sudan. They failed with the intent to develop the production for the welfare of the Sudanese people. This led to a high rate of crimes, and even people raised arms and entered the country in excruciating civil wars until the moment” (Interview in Khartoum, on 9th November, 2019).

The views that were held by the participating respondent in Khartoum were not so different from those of the participating respondent in Darfur, where one official (R23) who was interviewed in Darfur summarized the whole situation and said that:

“Foreign colonialism left Sudan as if it was the sick man of Africa” (Interview in Darfur, on 4th February, 2020).

The question of national integration in Sudan where there exists a multiplicity of ethnic groups has been a sticking problem which has not only elicited societal threats; it was also a strong factor that led to the secession of South Sudan (Barry, 1997). The people in the South were marginalized socially and economically (Chuei, 2009); and there was no chance that the people of the south were going to be comfortable in a Sudan which was so divided almost in every aspect of life. Another participating respondent (R21) was also negative on the issue of national integration but also invoked the evils of the colonialists when he said that:

“The problem of the lack/ weakness of national unity arose from foreign colonialism, through the implementation of the policy of divide and rule, the tendency of Jellaba against the Westerners (Superior), even on occasions of marriage ... As for our identity, we do not know ourselves are we Africans or we are Arabs, and Sudan, going to Arab club it makes it to lose a lot” (Interview in Darfur, 1st February, 2020).

In showing how even the judicial system could not bring about national integration but represent the colonial system, the legacy of British colonial rule had a significant impact even after independence. Most of the lawyers and judges were British trained and initially tended to rely on judicial precedent. Soon after independence, however, pressure began to build to change the legal system. By the time al-Numayri seized power in 1969, a commission had been working on recommendations for a new system, but he dissolved it and formed another commission dominated by 12 Egyptian jurists. Based on recommendations received from them, Sudan adopted a new civil code that looked much like the Egyptian civil code of 1949. The new system was controversial because it disregarded existing laws and customs and introduced many new legal terms and concepts from Egyptian law without source material to interpret the codes (La verle, 2015, p. 244). When the issues of national integration are being discussed, it was

as if social aspects are being debated, it is important not to forget the issue of language as very important in the national integration process which is vital for national security. Social institutions that are built in any given State, instructions are given in a given language, even in education. Where language has not been handled very well, there has been conflict. The colonialists did not only interrupt the State formation process in Africa, but also had far reaching effects on the indigenous languages that were being used by the citizens in Africa when English and French were taught. These languages made it hard for the African societies to develop their own languages which would effectively lead to a national language and subsequently the failure to have a national language led to disagreements.

The social, political, and military threats in Sudan as effects of the past-colonial history

The conceptualization of security changed dramatically after the Copenhagen school explained what security can mean outside the traditional security arena (Hard security). It has now been shown that non-military (Citizens) the non-combatant, governmental, commercial or economic aspects, environmental, educational, the cultural and societal (Social security) can be very lethal threats towards the two referents of security (Traditional security and critical security). The dynamism in the international system has revealed that national security can be threatened by the domain of security through occurrences of social actions (Jacek, 2012). By carefully examining the other sources of threats, comprising the societal, environmental, and economic, it can be argued that the process of State formation in Africa that was interrupted by the colonialists did not spare these areas which would have generated home grown or traditionally created systems that would have protected the States like Sudan from the different threats that have compromised the African States which have been labeled as “failed” States or “collapsed” States by different scholars (Rotberg, 2011). The people in Africa had developed their own education system based on apprenticeship through which girls and boys were educated by learning directly from their elders (Okello, 2015). All this brought the whole lot of learning in economics, social and environment.

This scenario shows that the State of Sudan like other States in Africa whose State formations have not only found it hard with traditional security, but has also faced threats from the societal, economic, political and environmental factors. While in an interview with the participating respondent (R12) it was revealed that:

“Security, political, social and military threats in Sudan are the consequence of foreign colonialism” (Interview in Khartoum, on 9th December, 2019).

The economic injustices and political injustices by the British between the north and south of Sudan (Chuei, 2009) and (Alex, 2007) prepared the ground for the economic and social threats that are affecting the people of Sudan. This line of thinking was also upheld by another participating respondent (R1) who narrated that:

“Social, security, political and military threats in Sudan are made by colonialism, but Sudanese politicians also have a big role in the continuity of the threats and not to find solutions to the threats” (Interview in Khartoum, on 30th October, 2019).

It is therefore important to note that “national security”, can be threatened by social, economic and political threats which emanate from Africa’s colonial past. The question of slavery and the weakening of several institutions like the judiciary, social institutions and economic institutions led to threats. These threats needed to be guarded against but the colonial State which was the recognized State by so many authors did not in any way concern itself with safeguarding the citizen and the State in Africa. Once the traditions, norms and values of the Africans were not protected it meant that the State was not going to be protected (Kitler, 2011).

Contribution of national and international institutions to the security of Sudan

In 2015 Timothy M. Shaw and Fantu Cheru while discussing African international relations made a revelation about African societies and how their interactions with other people from other places changed almost everything in their lives (Cornelissen et al., 2011). In relation to what they were talking about, there was an argument that was made by Wierzbicki Sławomir and Tarasiuk Renata, which emphasized the fact that the colonial occurrence in Africa did not leave the Africans the same and the impact was far reaching. In their words they wrote that:

A legacy of colonialism, which stopped natural development processes of African societies, turns out to be other problem. Repeating standards of European countries did not harmonize with mentality and forms of the social life of autochthons, it forced the return to pre-colonial principles of the functioning of society. This also applies to political institutions, where e.g. in Uganda survived traditional kingdoms, whereas in Ghana and Nigeria the structures of tribal States. The loyalties to own political institutions is necessary for the system efficiency and therefore return to classic systems of the power in Africa turned out to be right (Wierzbicki and Tarasiuk, 2017).

The revelation by the authors above was confirmed in an interview that was carried out with the participating respondents who still see that the combination of the

national and the international institutions have not worked well towards the security of Sudan and the rest of the African States because the influence comes from the same source. While answering the question of the same, one respondent (R8) stated that:

“National and international institutions can provide technical assistance to national institutions, raise debts, provide economic support, technology, removing Sudan from States sponsoring terrorism list, activate markets and integrate Sudan into the global market ... and develop Sudan’s economy, empowering Sudan to develop its industrial products and market them, and open a way for the training of Sudanese youth in various fields. The big question is that who wants Africa to be well when it is providing cheap everything which the colonialists came looking for a long time ago. When we fight, they sell arms!” (Interview in Khartoum, on 30th November, 2019).

Africa has not benefitted a lot from the international institutions because of the fact that those that colonized Africa were already powerful when Africa was experiencing independence. They were at the Centre of all the institutions and could only integrate the new de jure African State into world politics and world economics under the different institutions like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. The African State has not gained much since there are many barriers faced by these countries (Amin, 2007). It is very hard to imagine that economic security of African States can be revamped with such institutions.

According to Moyo, (2009) foreign aid is just another threat which is slowly killing African values through corruption. He further argues that, the aid is crippling economic growth and is leading States in Africa into poverty. The economic debt that Africa is accumulating is making many more States poorer, and these have led to Africans becoming slaves and have surrendered its resources to those that have given aid. In his work “China in Africa: Debt Diplomacy” Nathanael T. Niambi, has argued that the State in Africa is under a heavy burden which is making it lose financial autonomy and therefore development cannot easily be attained (Nathanaël, 2019). According to Elliot Smith (2020) Chinese companies are pushing for the power over Glencore’s Zambian operation Mopan. This is a sign of economic insecurity which many States in Africa are going through. The economic insecurity in Sudan is not a secret when loss of revenue from the oil from South Sudan which was part of Sudan stopped flowing through Port Sudan.

When the debate of security focuses on the internal or domestic security, it is worth mentioning that there is confusion as to whether one is talking about “national security’ or “State security”. In some circumstances these concepts are used as if they are the same (Ziêba et al, 2004) and Jerzy and Ewa, (2015), even when an

individual is to check with scientific publications. To Kitler (2011), State’s security has often been concerned with the fact that, in the contemporary times security has been related to the maintenance of stability in the public of the State and guaranteeing its domestic and global security depending on the power it has. Another participating respondent (R13) further said that:

“International and national institutions in Sudan must support the peace process in Sudan and encourage good governance. Helping the Sudanese woman to establish a State based on a democratic system, training the Sudanese youth in the independence of the resources and the promotion of education” (Interview in Khartoum, on 13th December, 2019).

This revelation also exposes the fact that there are no institutions which are considered helpful and all-embracing given the fact that Sudan is a multi-ethnic State with divisions which were deepened by the colonialists for their selfish ends and even when they left, they are not working to make these States stronger, but maintain their weaknesses.

Jeffrey Herbst (2014), asserts that the national institutions in African States have failed to deal with local disputes which have widened again and the international institutions have either could not or they did not feel like having to risk (Herbst, 2014). This could be the same situation which happened during or after the cold war which did not only divide up Africa, but also threatened the security of African States. It is not surprising that the bipolarity of the international system worsened the security situation in States like Angola. It was thought that the end of the cold war would mean well for the African States; but the old wars were succeeded by new wars, or civil wars which reopened the new evil of ethnic violence which is synonymous with the colonial past. Therefore, international institutions have not done much; otherwise the debated genocide in Darfur could not have happened.

Recommendations for strong functioning institutions

The literature on African States demonstrates their negligible responsibility and weak nature of the institutions. It is because of this, that concepts like “fragile” and “collapsed” States (Rotberg, 2011) have been used to describe the States that cannot protect their citizens neither can they provide services which are in the five sectors that are known to be sources of security threats as described by (Ole, Waever, and Wilde, 1998). The blurred and obscured nature of institutions in African States can be related to several factors which include, the historical factors play a major part in this indistinct recognition of African States and their institution. Furthermore, the fact that these States were colonized, exploited and maligned before, those who did this, still

want to show them in that nature because that is how they can continue to exploit them. In addition, the minor involvement in the functioning of international institutions; and external influence which started so many years in history featuring colonization and slave trade. This means, they have not been regarded as critical actors (Sławomir and Renata, 2017) that can be part of the global negotiating group over the different issues which affect their security and international security. While talking about the aspects of recommendations on the institutions, one official (R1) stated that:

“There must be a permanent constitution for the country, which the people refer to, and participate in writing the constitution. The State must be a State law and a State of institutions ... There must be economic reformation, and building a Sudanese nation and society” (Interview in Khartoum, on 30th October, 2019).

The revelation that constitutions can assist in having strong institutions and the participation of the citizens imply the concern over the multiplicity of ethnic groups in Sudan and the marginalization of some groups. In the same line of thinking, (Ronen, 1976) has been giving some of the most disturbing features of ethnic divisions and how they can be dealt with. On the issue of constitutionalism and the security of African States, (Steyn, 2017) argued that, clear thinking informs that the building of political communities can be done with principles of constitutionalism where the rule of law, separation of powers and the guarantee of fair distribution of power where citizens are guided by law not men.

This implies that laws which Locke and Rousseau talked about in their social contract theory. In support of the above, another writer in the names of (Fombad, 2011) wrote that a clear recognition of the need for radical changes ... In some cases, it meant a total break with a dreadful past ... but in most cases it meant recognizing that a constitutional framework built around the one-party system that had bred authoritarian and dictatorial rule was a recipe for political instability and economic decline (Fombad, 2011: 98).

This informs that the constitution is very fundamental in the process of making institutions in Sudan stronger; without which the State will no longer be able to have guard rails. This can also be explained by the constant abrogation of the ad hoc constitutional making by the military leaders that have ruled Sudan since independence. No wonder when the same issue of recommendation for stronger institutions was put to another participating respondent (R10) a similar answer was given and the official echoed the issue of having a constitution where he said that:

“To build strong and functioning institutions in Sudan, Sudan needs a permanent, just and comprehensive

constitution agreed upon by all components of the people; a strategic plan to build a strong economy; and stable political, social and cultural situation” (Interview in Khartoum, on 4th December, 2019).

In the words of another participating respondent (R7) while answering the same questions in an interview in Khartoum the official also sounded quite similar with the rest of the respondents when she said that:

The revelation in all this shows the importance of national integration, participation and having laws and the constitution which stipulates the citizens, the distribution of power, and declaring the functioning of the institutions in the State of Sudan. This also calls for the way institutions like the army function and how the process of recruitment can be done without marginalizing the small ethnic groups that may not be considered as important. It is important to note that weak institutions cannot be useful in the protection of human and national security in Sudan. It is therefore, important to look at the past using the analysis of State formation to understand the State that was formed by colonialists after interrupting the process by the indigenous societies. The institutions built therefore, will reflect the values, norms, traditions, and customs of the people of Sudan while changing those institutions that were built to protect colonialism.

Conclusion

According to the findings from interviews, records, and literature reviewed, the nature of institutions built to protect national security cannot be relied on to meet the national security needs of the State of Sudan and its citizens because they are weak and built on a fluid background left by the aliens who disrupted the State formation process. R12, R4, R5, R6, R7, R13, and R20, for example, demonstrated how national and international institutions contributed to Sudan's security. They also demonstrated how the inherited institutions designed to serve the interests of colonialists, institutions built on ethnic divisions, economic imperialism, and political authoritarianism, and designed to integrate colonies into an imperial domination of colonizing powers, could not protect the State of Sudan. From the foregoing, one can conclude that the inherited institutions designed to serve the interests of colonialists, institutions built on ethnic divisions, economic imperialism, and political authoritarianism, and designed to integrate colonies into an imperial domination of colonizing powers, could not protect the State of Sudan. It was also demonstrated how international institutions established by former colonialists or invaders continue to influence Sudanese internal institutions, rendering them ineffective in ensuring Sudan's national security. This implies that once the process of State formation is disrupted, it is extremely

difficult to establish institutions capable of ensuring national security. This was the goal of this study's investigation into State formation and national security.

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